* THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS
"Legislation concerning judicial organization throughout our history has been a very empiric response to very definite needs." * NTERNAL revenue collections for 1940 were less than five billion dollars.' They averaged a good deal less than four billion dollars for the ten preceding years. Internal revenue taxes itder thepresent law are estimated to yield over forty-three billion dollars.! These facts have become comnionplace, but they cannot for that reason be ignored. A tenfold increase in the amount of revenue means a large increase in the number and complexity of tax controversies. The burden of handling these cases will fall primarily on the Bureau of Internal Revenue.' But the rules which il control the Bureau will be made ultimately by the courts. And " ultimately," long experience has shown, is likely in many cases f be a very long time. Our present system for judicial review of acases is badly adapted to meet the problems of tax administration which clearly lie ahead. It is the thesis of this article that, in iaterest of taxpayers and the government alike, we should revite that system so that the important judicial function in tax cases y be speedily and surely exercised. far the largest proportion of tax controversies are handled tratively. The Treasury has set up elaborate machinery _""I2t1e disposition of these cases. This machinery is of course not 4 slPRTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS Q THE SUPREME COURT (1927) perfect. It can certainly be improved.' But it can in no event work with real effectiveness unless the Treasury personnel can have within a reasonable time the authoritative rules which are to guide their disposition of tax controversies. At the present time, the final judicial answer is long withheld. In the meantime, there is much uncertainty, confusion, discrimination, and inconsistency. The Treasury so far has generally been unable to take a clear and single position on many questions. Not knowing which way the courts will eventually come out, it has felt forced to blow both Jlot and cold on many matters over a period of many years.' This is the cause of much irritation to taxpayers, of great delay in the disposition of cases, and of many of the difficulties faced both by tax administrators and by taxpayers and their counsel in dealing with tax administrators. If there is a way in which the judicial determination of tax cases can be effected more speedily, it should certainly be given careful consideration. At the present time, most of the tax cases which get into court start in the Tax Court of the United States. Congress has, of course, declared that the Tax Court is " an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government." I This is a polite fiction that may once have served a purpose. But the Tax Court is in organization, tradition, and function a judicial body, and should be treated as such in any survey of judicial review in tax cases. Tax cases may also be commenced in any of the ninety odd district courts of the United States, in the Court of Claims, and, occasignally, in state courts. This diversity of origin would not be a serious matter if the cases.then focussed intd a unified system of review. But appeals from the district courts and the Tax Court lie to the ten circuit courts of appeals an4 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The tax decisions of these courts, and of the Court of Claims, and of state courts are reviewable only by the Supreme Court on certiorari, and that is rarely obtainable until a conflict of decisions has developed. Thus it is not enough to litigate a tax question. It must be litigated twice, SSee, e.g., Note, Finality of Administrative Settlements in Federal Tax Cases (1944) or three times, or four times." The question almost always remains an open one until a conflict develops. And the process of obtaining a conflict often takes an inordinately long time. It is in any event beyond the control of the ordinary taxpayer, and thus largely fortuitous in its operation in specific cases. The resulting uncertainty causes much difficulty and delay in tax administration, and is the basis of a large part of the dissatisfaction with the present administration of the tax laws. The administrators are themselves hardly to blame for this condition, but it is difficult to make their predicament understandable to the general public. Any tax practitioner has frequently had a client come to him with a recent decision of the Tax Court which he has found in a service or news letter. The client has been enthusiastic, feeling that the case, which was decided favorably to the taxpayer, squarely covers the problem with which he has been confronted. But the lawyer has to shrug his shoulders. Though the case is well considered and carefully reasoned, he knows that there are eleven courts of appeal which review the decisions of the Tax Court. Even if this case is not appealed, and thus becomes final, another case involving the same point may come along which will be appealed. But the case is in fact appealed to a circuit court of appeals, and in due time that court affirms the decision of the Tax Court. Now the client returns with even more enthusiasm. He feels that he must have something fairly definite and certain by now. The Tax Court and an important appellate court have both considered the very question he is interested in, and both have reached the same result. Besides, the question has been pending in court for many months. But the lawyer must again shrug his shoulders. He knows that there is no conflict, and thus small chance that the Government will even try to take the case to the Supreme Court. Some other case must start somewhere and work its way along through the same process until at last a conflicting And until the Supreme Court has decided it, there is virtually nothing that the taxpayer or his counsel -or the Government -can rely on. It is curious that we should still have a system in which the final answers to many important questions are so long postponed.
What is the effect of this on tax administration? If the Tax Court decision, or its affirmance by a circuit court of appeals, does not produce anything upon which the taxpayer or his counsel may rely, this is equally true of the tax administrator. Suppose a question comes before a tax administrator, and it is pointed out to him by counsel that two circuit courts of appeals have decided the question against the Government. It is argued to the administrator that he should therefore not press the point further against the taxpayer with whom he is concerned. The administrator may feel that the two cases in question are well reasoned, and that the point should be settled in favor of the taxpayer. Nevertheless, it takes a large amount of indepenaence and courage on his part to make such a decision, and very generally he will not feel able to take that responsibility. For the point is still an open one until the Supreme Court has spoken. Even though one of the circuit court of appeals decisions cited to him is by the court in the taxpayer's circuit, it is not necessarily controlling. For the same question may go up through another circuit, a conflict may develop, and then the point will be open in the Supreme Court; and its decision may well be contrary to the decision of the circuit court of appeals which is cited to the administrator.
In such a situation, administrators necessarily feel that they must continue to press points which have been decided against the Government by the Tax Court or even by several circuit courts of appeals. And taxpayers and their counsel frequently feel that they must make a settlement of a point on which they think they are right, and on which the decisions are in their favor, because they cannot afford to litigate the question themselves, and the wait for a Supreme Court decision may be long and hazardous. Like nearly everything in the tax field, this is a matter which works both ways. 
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There may be several lower court decisions in favor of the Government on a point, but the administrator will feel that he should compromise the question with the taxpayer, because the taxpayer is still free to litigate it and seek a conflict, or hold the matter open until someone else carries through the search for the ultimate route to the Supreme Court. In this process tens of thousands of cases must be adjusted in the absence of an authoritative rule, and the result is expense and discrimination for taxpayers and dissatisfaction for nearly everyone on both sides of the administrative process. Numerous examples could be given of the unhappy working out of this process in actual operation. It is nothing new. One of the most striking illustrations involved a type of question which normally and naturally arises very frequently in tax administrationthe situation where a man dies and leaves a trust in favor of his widow. In such a case, there was room for controversy as to how the widow should be taxed on the income from the trust. The Treasury undertook to tax the income to the widow like the income of any ordinary trust. But it was argued that the widow had bought her interest in the trust by giving up her right to dower, and that she should not have any tax to pay until the income payments to her should equal in the aggregate the amount of the dower which she had given up in order to obtain the benefit of the trust. This question was first decided by a circuit court of appeals in Warner v. Walsh.! This case involved the tax years 1917 and 1918. The decision was reached in 1926, and was in favor of the taxpayer. The Government nevertheless persisted in its efforts to tax the beneficiary in such cases. It was unsuccessful, however, in two other circuit courts of appeals.' The Commissioner then felt that he had tried long enough and that he should not harass taxpayers further. He therefore issued a ruling to the effect that the widows should not be taxed in such a case." A natural consequence of this ruling was that the Commissioner should try to tax 
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the income to the trustee. But some trustees resisted and the question as to them wended its way through the courts. It finally got to the Supreme Court in 1933 in Helvering v. Butterworth.'o The counsel for the Commissioner there made a curious argument. He said in effect: " If you won't let us tax the widows, then we think that you should let us tax the trustee, and we so argue here. But our real position is that the widows are taxable, and if you agree with us on that then you should of course decide this case in favor of the trustee." The Supreme Court did agree, and it was finally decided that the widows were taxable. This decision came in 1933, seven years after the question had first been decided by a circuit court of appeals, and sixteen years after the first of the tax years involved in that case. In the meantime, there must have been many thousands of controversies in the Bureau which had to be argued out and adjusted in one way or another for want of a definite and authoritative rule on what was, after all, a rather typical and homely sort of point. And the consequences of the confusion persisted for many years after the question was at last settled. There was the problem of Stone v. White; " and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to decide a question in this field as late as 1941,12 which could have been avoided if the federal tax question had not been left so long in confusion. This is one example. It could be illustrated many times again. The rule as to the deductibility on the cash basis of prepaid insurance premiums has not yet been authoritatively established, though it has been changed and rechanged to follow conflicting lower court decisions." But no one even now knows with any cer-10 290 U. S. 365 (1933) .
301 U. S. 532 (937).
Problems of this sort, arising out of the long delays now required before important tax questions can be settled by an authoritative court decision are responsible for one of the most complex provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. This is § 3801x, [Vol. 5 7 tainty what is the proper rule on this simple point. Sonleone may some day get a conflict and take the question to the Supreme Court, which will be wholly free to decide either way. For a recent striking illustration, consider the famous and unhappy Virginian Hotel decision." The effect of a lack of " tax benefit " on an excessive depreciation deduction in prior years had been many times decided by the Board of Tax Appeals. It must have been an issue before the Bureau in many thousands of cases. It was first considered by an appellate court in Pittsburgh Brewing Co. v. Commissioner," and the decision was in favor of the taxpayer. The Government did not apply for certiorari. There was no basis for it in the absence of a conflict. This decision was repeatedly followed by the Board." Four years later the Virginian Hotel case came along; the necessary conflict had developed," and the Supreme Court finally decided the question against the taxpayers' contentions. It would be difficult to devise a system which would make tax administration more difficult and more unsatisfactory.
For a final illustration, let us consider the problem finally decided in Helvering v. Janney." The question was how to compute the amount of the deduction for charitable contributions on a joint return of husband and wife -certainly a homely matter, and one which must have been involved in many thousands of cases before the administrative authorities. It is also the type of question on which one rule is about as good as another; the really important thing is to have a definite answer to the question'1 9 so again, Welch v. De Blois was overruled, and the court held that the advance portion of the premiums could not be deducted. Comm'r v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.(2d) 966 (C. C. A. ist, 1942 Many other equally simple, frequently-recurring questions, affecting many taxpayers, could be added to the list. 7 But it is not necessary to make a list, for there is no question which is not on it; or has not been on it until the Supreme Court spoke. Those who say that instances of the sort mentioned are merely unfortunate accidents in an otherwise sound system 28 are merely shutting their eyes to the overwhelming glare of the facts. Our present system of tax adjudication inevitably leaves nearly eVery question uncertain during the entire period while it must be dealt with, usually in thousands of instances, by the administrative officers. And yet that is just the period when there should be an authoritative rule if the system is to work smoothly, effectively, speedily, fairly, and without discrimination. Under our present system delay and discrimination are typical and inevitable. 1931 and 1932.82 The earlier of these cases arose out of a tax return which was filed in 1926. It was seventeen years after that return was filed before the question at issue was finally passed upon by the Supreme Court. One of the remaining cases involved an excise tax for the year 1934." It got to the Supreme Court because of a conflict with a decision rendered in 1938, likewise involving the year 1934." The decision of the Supreme Court was contrary to that reached in the 1938 case. Thus the point was finally put at rest nine years after the tax was due, and in a way which it may be confidently asserted was contrary to that which had been applied in the of general application upon important questions of law for many years after the close of any taxable year. The average period between the taxable year in dispute and a Supreme Court decision relating thereto is nine years. Meanwhile confusion reigns in the day-by-day settlement of the more debatable questions of the tax law. One circuit court holds that a certain situation gives rise to tax liability; another circuit holds the contrary. The Commissioner and the lower federal courts are both confronted with the problem of reconciling the irreconcilable. A great part of the criticism of changing interpretations of the law announced by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is properly attributable to the multitude of tribunals with original jurisdiction in tax cases, and to the absence of provision for decisions with nationwide authority in the majority of cases. If we were seeking to secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax jurisprudence, we could hardly do better than to provide for 87 Courts with original jurisdiction, ii appellate bodies of cordinate rank, and only a discretionary review of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court. [Vol. 5 7 1 162
19441

THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS
case of the great majority of the taxpayers who were affected by the tax. The remaining twelve cases involved income tax liability for years from 1935 through 1939. Thus, the elapsed time varied from four to eight years. But in nearly every case, the question got to the Supreme Court because of a conflict. The conflicting decision was rendered as long ago in one case as 1933," and the tax year involved in that case was 192 I. Thus it was about twenty-two years'before that particular complexity was resolved. The years involved in the conflicting decisions in the other income tax cases ranged from 1929 through 1938. On the whole, it may be said that in the cases decided by the Supreme Court in the calendar year 1943 it was on the average at least ten years from the time the point was first raised until it was finally authoritatively determined. This is not written in criticism of the Supreme Court. No one who is familiar with the work of that Court could criticize it for delay. If anything, it may be said that the cases sometimes come up for hearing there too quickly to give counsel an adequate opportunity to prepare them properly. The difficulty is not with the time the Supreme Court takes with the cases after they get there, but with the time it takes to get a question actually before the Supreme Court. It is true that the Court could help a great deal even under our present system by making less of a fetish of the conflict test as a basis for granting certiorari. The Court could exercise a greater instinct for the vital federal tax quiestions, and grant certiorari the first time such a question appears." But this would not go to the heart of the problem. Many of the questions on which authoritative rules are needed are not striking questions. There are more of such cases than the Supreme Court could handle consistently with its important duties in other fields of the law. Though the Supreme Court could undoubtedly help by showing a greater heed for the administrative consequences of its decisions, the Court cannot under our present system do all that has to be done.
A COURT OF TAx APPEALS
The answer suggested here is to relieve the circuit courts of appeals entirely of their duties in federal tax cases, and transfer them to a new tribunal which might well be called the Court of Tax Appeals.
This new court should have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review all civil decisions in federal tax cases made by any court, Appeals should lie to it in federal tax cases from the district courts and from the Tax Court of the United States. It should supersede the ten circuit courts of appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in this respect. Appeals should also lie to it in federal tax cases from the Court of Claims, in order that final authority in all federal tax matters may be centralized in one tribunal. The judgments of the Court of Claims have heretofore been subject to review only by the Supreme Court. But much of the benefit to be derived from centralizing review in tax cases would be lost if appeals from tax decisions of the Court of Claims were to follow any different course than appeals from other courts entrusted with the trial of tax cases.
It would seem desirable, and not at all inconsistent with the basic purposes of the plan, to leave criminal cases to their present procedural path. They would naturally begin in the district courts, and appeals should continue to lie to the circuit courts of appeals. Criminal cases involve more of general law than of tax law anyway, and our traditional approach to criminal cases requires that they be handled by the regular courts. They form a part of the regular stream of criminal cases which properly come before the circuit courts of appeals. It would be rarely, if ever, that a circuit court of appeals could consider a tax point in a criminal case which would There would seem to be little room for difficulty in drawing the line between criminal cases and noncriminal cases in the tax field.
On rare occasions such a question might arise as whether an order committing a party or his counsel for contempt in a tax case was a civil or a criminal appeal." But, generally, all cases not originating by indictment or information would appear to be civil cases. Thus, a case involving a tax penalty is a civil case." Cases involving forfeitures of property for violations of the tax laws 89 would likewise be civil cases appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Other types of cases which do not directly involve the determination of tax liability, such as suits to enforce or to enjoin the enforcement of tax liens," or to quiet title, although somewhat unusual and not directly affecting the general run of tax litigation, are clearly civil cases. They should be appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals unless some very difficult lines are to be drawn, and the possibility of conflict perpetuated.
Review of the occasional federal tax decision made by state courts presents a minor problem." At the present time, these cases 87 Cf. Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925) .
If the line is to be drawn between civil and criminal cases, there should clearly be a provision in the statute providing for transfer of any appeal taken to the wrong court. Appellants should not be put to the risk of guessing right on matters of this sort which bear no relation to the merits of their cases. Cf. 
247, z99 N. E. 2o6 (1935)).
* follow the normal state procedure, subject only to ultimate review by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. If all other federal tax cases, however, are decided by the Court of Tax Appeals it would be anomalous to have these few cases go directly to the Supreme Court. There would seem to be no reason why state officers or state courts would be concerned about the type of review when the question is one of federal taxation. It should be possible, therefore, to have review in these cases, too, by the Court of Tax Appeals. Alternative methods of review might be devised. Ordinarily the federal tax question in such cases would be a " separable controversy " and provision could be made in the statutes for the removal of such questions to the appropriate federal district court. Review then would be directly by the Court of Tax Appeals. Another method would be a provision under which state courts might certify or refer to the Court of Tax Appeals any federal tax question which arose before the state court. The Court of Tax Appeals could then render its decision on the question and certify it to the state court where it would be binding on the federal tax aspects of the case. 42 This would not in any sense be an advisory opinion, for it would be an actual decision in an actual controversy presently pending before the court. It should not be too difficult to work out an appropriate procedure for review of the occasional federal tax question which gets into a state court. It would be undesirable to ignore these cases on the ground that they are rare and ordinarily not of great importance, since divergent methods of review in tax cases will inevitably lead to conflict of decisions with the resulting confusion and uncertainty the elimination of which is the major purpose of the new system.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF A COURT OF TAx APPEALS
When a means has been devised to focus all federal tax cases into the one Court of Tax Appeals, the question still remains as to the review of the decisions of that court. Court in all cases involving constitutional questions. The construction and application of the Constitution is the chief of the high functions of that Court, and it must be the final arbiter of constitutional questions in the tax field as in all other fields of the law.
Whether review of constitutional questions should be by appeal or on certiorari is a close question. The chief objection to review by appeal would be the number of frivolous or unsubstantial constitutional questions which might be raised in order to take such cases to the Supreme Court. But the Court would naturally apply here the usual requirement that there be a " substantial " question as a prerequisite to review on appeal." Thus, the jurisdictional statement on appeal could serve much the same function as a petition for certiorari. Either method of review would seem to be equally acceptable, although review of constitutional questions by appeal might get questions before the Supreme Court sooner so that authoritative opinions on constitutional questions in tax cases might be more promptly available. Should Supreme Court review likewise extend to questions of statutory construction and application, and other questions of tax law? We are accustomed to have all decisions of lower federal tribunals reviewable by the Supreme Court either by appeal or on certiorari. But there is no reason why all cases have to be reviewable by the Supreme Court, and there have been long periods in our history when many decisions were not subject to such review." It could be argued that the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals must be final on all except constitutional questions unless we are to perpetuate the difficulties which now plague us. If all decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals should be subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari, then no point decided by the Court of Tax Appeals would be finally settled and no decision of the Court of Tax Appeals could be relied on with complete safety. See FRNKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREIME COURT (1927) 87-102. though certiorari was not applied for in the particular case, or was applied for and denied, no one could be sure that another case might not come along in which certiorari would be granted. Whenever the question did get into the Supreme Court, it would still be wide open. The Court would be free to decide it as it chose; and its decision might not be in accord with that which had been reached by the Court of Tax Appeals in the previous case.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the potentiality of review by the Supreme Court is normal, and by now, at least, traditional in our federal judicial system." It furnishes a possible safety valve, and any effort to establish a Court of Tax Appeals without the possibility of review by the Supreme Court by certiorari would probably result in substantial opposition. The risk to the finality of the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals does not seem to be important enough to warrant either the break with tradition or the threat of opposition. If a Court of Tax Appeals were established with review by the Supreme Court on certiorari, it may be confidently expected that the Supreme Court would undertake to reexamine very few of its decisions. In the first place, the conflict of decisions which is now the chief basis for getting a case into the Supreme Court would be almost invariably lacking. In the second place, the Supreme Court could be counted on to respect the purpose and function of the Court of Tax Appeals, and to recognize that its decisions should as a matter of practice be final in all but exceptional cases. This has been the actual experience with customs cases, which, though now freely reviewable by the Supreme 45The history of the Court of Customs Appeals has shown a progressive elimination of restrictions on review. When that couft was established, its decisions were made final in all cases, and there was no review by the Supreme Court even on con- 
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Court on certiorari, are almost never taken up by that Court except for the occasional case involving an important constitutional question."
If we had a Court of Tax Appeals it would have in fact substantially final authority on most tax questions, but there is no reason to think that this would be either unwise or undesirable. The Supreme Court has already gone far to give the lower courts final authority on all questions of fact, and it has made an unfortunate effort to give the Tax Court final authority on many questions of law. The Court of Tax Appeals will obviously be a specialized tribunal. It should develop facility and a consistent approach in matters of statutory construction and general policy. Very likely it will make mistakes. That would not be novel. The Supreme Court has not been unduly felicitous in some of its tax decisions. Congress has had to change a great many of them by subsequent legislation." But under our present system, these changes come very late, after the question involved has been mooted and argued and litigated through the Treasury and courts in many cases over a period of years. The resulting corrective legislation by Congress has often had to be retroactive over a long period, with consequent discrimination between taxpayers who may or may not be able to take advantage of the retroactive legislation for one reason or another." If there were a Court of Tax Appeals with practical final authority in matters of statutory construction and general policy, the need for legislative action would appear much more promptly -without the necessity of waiting for a conflicting opinion and an eventual decision by the Supreme Court. the taxpayer was denied a deduction for 1936 under the retroactive application of 1 23(a) (2) of the Code (relating to nontrade and nonbusiness expenses) because he had litigated the question before the Board of Tax Appeals before the amendment to the statute was passed. Other taxpayers who had not been involved in the previous litigation would clearly be entitled to the deduction.
I1169
HARVARD LAW REVIEW The Dobson Case
Is there any need for such a change in our system of judicial tax procedure? Has not the Supreme Court already accomplished much the same result through its decision in the Dobson case? " The answer to the latter question is clearly and emphatically, No! The difficulties with the Dobson case in theory and in practice have already been developed by Mr. Randolph Paul."o No one understands its scope," and there is almost certain to be more litigation as to the applicability of the Dobson rule than there was as to the basic tax questions themselves. This sort of litigation about procedure is, futile and fruitless. It results from an effort to import into the tax field notions of finality which have recently been developed with respect to administrative tribunals. But apart from the merits of these notions themselves, they have no proper application to the Tax Court. That court is a court in name and in fact, and in everything else except the letter of the statute and the Committee Reports. It acts judicially, and has a fine record in acting judicially. It is not a policy formulating and enforcing agency. It sits impartially between the Commissioner and the taxpayer.
Moreover, and this is most important, the Tax Court of the United States is in reality sixteen tax courts. In the formulation of the Dobson rule, it is clear that the Tax Court was thought of as a unified entity, like the Federal Power Commission, or the Securities and Exchange Commission. But the fact, of course, is that each judge of the Tax Court ordinarily sits alone to hear a tax case, and the great majority of cases are not only heard by that Of these, 540 were memorandum decisions by a single judge. The officially reported decisions in the same year numbered 264. Of these, 200 were the decision of a single judge, and 64 were reviewed by the court. Thus, a total of 740 cases were decided by the opinion of a single judge, while 64, or about eight per cent of the whole number, were reviewed by the court. There is no criticism of the Tax Court in this. There is a great deal of labor involved in hearing a tax case, formulating findings of fact, and rendering an opinion on the issues involved. The sixteen judges of the Tax Court could not sit together on all of the cases. But the fact remains that the great majority of the decisions of the Tax Court are rendered by a single judge without formal deliberation or consultation. Even where the decision is reviewed by the court, only one judge has seen the witnesses and heard the evidence. There is no opportunity for oral argument before the other judges. The adjudication even in such a case is considerably removed from a case which is argued in open court and heard by all the judges who then participate in the deliberations and the decision.
This difficulty may be heightened by the fact that the Tax Court may now hear cases through commissioners, 52 so that the actual basic decision in the case may not even be made by one of the judges of the Tax Court. It has long been true that Board members and Tax Court judges have had the assistance of law clerks, whose views may be of more or less weight in the decision of cases." It is certainly highly desirable that the Tax Court should have these aids in the difficult task of trial work in tax cases. But the fact is emphasized that the Tax Court is to a considerable extent a collection of individuals and not an integrated, unified group. It is just the sort of instrument in our procedural system which, no matter how well its work is done in individual cases, may benefit from broad appellate review on all questions of law.
The result of this organization of the Tax Court, as every observer of the flow of Tax Court decisions knows, is a great deal of , and the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson that the Tax Court " is relatively better staffed for its task than is the judiciary." Dobson v. Gomm'r, 320 U. S. 489, 498 (1943) .
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variation and inconsistency in the decisions of that court. In a good many cases it may be said, without thought of criticism, but merely as a statement of fact, that the result in the case depends in large measure on the particular judge who happened to be assigned to hear the case. This appears to be true, for example, in many of the efforts by judges of the Tax Court to apply the Clifforod "rule." But apart from differences of approach in such matters, it is natural that the judges of the Tax Court should differ among themselves in the details of the construction and the application of the tax laws. One judge is not bound by the decision of another judge unless it has been reviewed by the whole court. Thus, each judge necessarily and naturally decides the cases which come before him the way he thinks they should be decided. He will of course try to follow the general body of the tax law. But if he disagrees with the conclusion reached by one of his fellow judges in a memorandum decision, he is most likely to ignore the other case and follow his own view. Memorandum decisions are not cited by the court in its published opinions, and they are not regarded as having much binding effect under the general rule of' stare decisis. But they do represent more than two-thirds of the total number of cases decided by the Tax Court. They represent the bulk of the decisions to which the Dobson rule applies. Because of the volume of cases to be decided, it is certainly necessary that most of these cases should be heard and decided by a single judge. But to give to such decisions the broad finality on many questions of law as well as of fact which is indicated by the Dobson case is to multiply diversity and discrimination, and not at all to aid a group policy-making agency to formulate and carry out its policies.
Even if the Dobson rule were clear and understandable in its application, and even if decisions of the Tax Court were always decisions of all the court, the Dobson rule would not solve the problem with which we are confronted. In the first place, a good many questions are undoubtedly" unmistakable questions of law "which are subject to review by the appellate courts. These questions now fan out from the Tax Court to eleven appellate tribunals, and we cannot know the answers until the tedious and wasteful process of conflict and ultimate decision by the Supreme Court has been carried through. ' Furthermore, although the bulk of the tax cases
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THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS 173 start in the Tax Court, there are a good many which begin in the district courts and the Court of Claims. No one knows how far the Dobson rule is to apply to review of the decisions of the district courts. Apparently, it should not apply at all, since its supposed rationale is wholly lacking. Thus, even though a question is one subject to the Dobson rule when it comes through the Tax Court, it will apparently be wide open in the circuit courts of appeals when it comes there through the district courts, and it will certainly be wide open in the Court of Claims. Thus, confusion and diversity are perpetuated. It will not do to say that circuit courts of appeals should in such cases defer to the opinions rendered by the Tax Court in other cases involving the same point. The point may not yet have been decided by the Tax Court. And again we should not forget that there are for this purpose in reality sixteen tax courts as a practical matter.
The only way to have a sensible system of court review of tax cases is to have a unified appellate procedure in all cases through a single Court of Tax Appeals. The Dobson case was formulated out of a desire to reduce the present confusion." The desire was wellfounded. But the Supreme Court is not the legislature. It does not have the means to deal with the whole problem comprehensively. The Dobson case was probably more than it should have undertaken along this line. In any event, it will not solve the problem, and will apparently aggravate it. But Congress does have the power to deal with the question. The lengths to which the Supreme Court has gone in the Dobson case emphatically point out the need for action. Congress can deal with the problem comprehensively and effectively, and it rather than the Supreme Court is the appropriate agency to revise the procedural system in tax cases. "We are getting too much law, and too many kinds of law, and from too many sources, for tax administration to be simple, or the law clear. Should we reserve to the Supreme Court only constitutional questions in tax matters? Should matters of statutory construction be settled by a tax court, instead of by the twelve Circuit Courts of Appeals, with their frequent conflict of viewpoint? " 13 TAx MAG. at 686.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW THE ANALOGY TO THE COURT OF CUSTOMS APPEALS
The creation of a single Court of Tax Appeals finds an interesting analogy in another closely related field of the law. There were many years in our history when customs duties provided the bulk of federal revenues. As recently as 1910, nearly half of the government's tax receipts came from taxes on imports." It was natural that these taxes should give rise to controversies, and the history of the handling of these controversies is remarkably similar to that which we have experienced to date in the internal revenue field. 56 The original method for contesting the validity of a customs exaction was a common-law suit against the collector of customs; "I and this in 1864 became a statutory suit against the collector." In the internal revenue field the corresponding suit against the collector still survives, and until comparatively recent times was the only remedy available to the taxpayer.
In 1890, the Board of General Appraisers was established in the customs field." This was clearly an administrative tribunal at the time it was set up. Its decisions were reviewable by the circuit court for the district where the transaction arose, with further review by the circuit courts of appeals and by the Supreme Court. Where the Board of General Appraisers had jurisdiction, the old remedy against the collector of customs was superseded. 6 0 Thus the only remedy was an appeal to the Board, with a further appeal to the circuit court, and on to the circuit court of appeals, with 
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possible review by the Supreme Court. This system was followed for the next nineteen years. At first it seemed to work very well, but in the course of time it gave rise to difficulties which are remarkably similar to those we now face in the internal revenue field. " Resort to the administrative method brought, not relief through economical and expert disposition of technical litigation, but new delays, waste, and confusion. Under this system four and a half years were consumed while litigation travelled at a snail's pace towards a final decision." 61 The Secretary of the Treasury complained in 1908 that " each of at least 120 judges [was] a possible final judge of customs appeals." 62 Investigation by the Senate Finance Committee disclosed " fatal delays " and " costly conflicts in the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals. The fiscal system of the Government was seriously affected by ill-adapted legal machinery." 63 The result was that Congress in 1909 established a single court to review all customs cases, the Court of Customs Appeals. 64 And from that time on there has never been any problem or difficulty with respect to customs litigation. A customs case almost never goes to the Supreme Court. The single court of review handles all cases expeditiously and effectively. It seems entirely safe to say that there is no body of complaint as to the handling of customs cases, and'has never been since the establishment of the single court of review more than thirty-five years ago.
In the interval, the Board of General Appraisers has metamorphosed into the Customs Court, 65 just as the Board of Tax Appeals has become the Tax Court of the United States. 66 And the Court of Customs Appeals has become the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 6 7 since the volume of work arising made it possible to combine both types of work in the same court. Here is an almost forgotten bit of history which it seems pertinent to reexamine in the present connection. The fact that it is so nearly forgotten is something of a demonstration of how effectively our machinery for handling customs litigation has worked. It is true that customs litigation is not wholly comparable to internal revenue litigation. The latter has become far more vast in volume and probably more difficult in complexity. But that simply emphasizes the desirability of coordinating review in internal revenue cases. The analogy between the two fields is a close one, and the results in the ciistoms field are very striking and encouraging." THE WORK OF A COURT OF TAx APPEALS Certain practical considerations must be examined. Are there not so many appeals in tax cases that a single court would be swamped if it alone had to hear all of them? Would this not result in delays which would cause greater confusion and more denial of justice than under the present system? Would there be any work left for the regular circuit courts of appeals if all of the tax cases were taken away from them? These are pertinent questions and the answers to some of them are by no means easy. Nevertheless, it does not appear that these practical difficulties are insuperable.
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The accompanying table illustrates the volume of work performed by the various federal appellate courts during the calendar year 1943. It has been made by paging the volumes of the Federal 68 "Many misgivings were expressed and many dark prophecies were indulged as to the future of such a specialized jurisdiction. The necessity for such action was great. District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal [s] differed widely on the interpretation of the law, and there were almost tas many views of the law as there were courts. The Supreme Court, with an overcrowded docket, was called upon frequently to determine which of the lower courts was right. Long delaysand expensive litigation worried the Government and harassed the importer. . . . Confronted with these conditions, which, owing to the steadily growingvolume of business, were becoming each day more alarming, Congress created the Court of Customs Appeals and all intermediate appellate steps were done away with." "I believe I can say that the hope of the framers of the law creating the present judicial system in customs matters has been fully realized. It has been realized in speedy and less expensive adjudication of customs questions and in the uniformity of decisions, all of which has resulted in stimulating commerce, in giving confidence to concerned business investment, has relieved the tax payer, made more certain the revenue in the Government Treasury and simplified the task of the customs lawyer. In some of the circuits, notably the Eighth and the Tenth, every case disposed of on stipulation of counsel following a settlement is reported in a memorandum. In other circuits, notably the Second and the Sixth, a good many cases which were fully briefed and argued, many of which required time for consideration, are decided in memorandum decisions. Thus the memoranda cannot be ignored. They have been listed in the table just as they appear in the Federal Reporter. Because of the different practices of the several courts, however, the figures as to memoranda are not particularly indicative. On the average, the memorandum decisions appear to amount to about fifteen per cent of the total. As a number of these required no action by the court, but were entered merely on stipulation of the parties, it would seem to be adequate to say that the considered memorandum decisions amount to about ten per cent of the published opinions. With this probable adjustment in mind, we can give consideration to the figures for full opinions. During the year 1943, the ten circuit courts of appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided 1763 cases by opinion. Of these, 309 were federal tax cases, leaving 1454 nontax cases decided by these courts. Thus the proportion of federal tax cases in the circuit courts of appeals was about seventeen and one-half per cent of the total."
One fairly safe conclusion may be drawn from these figures. Removing jurisdiction over federal tax cases from the circuit courts of appeals would not leave these courts with nothing to do. Commission cases, milk cases, patent cases, bankruptcy cases, diversity cases, and so on. Many of these fields are expanding, and several of the circuit courts of appeals are already crowded and delayed in their work. So far as the circuit courts of appeals are concerned, therefore, the elimination of tax cases would seem to be a distinct contribution to the efficient working of our federal judicial system.
What is the situation when we look at it from the other point of view, that is, when we consider the volume of work which would have to be handled by a single court of tax appeals? During the year 1943, the circuit courts of appeals issued 309 opinions in tax cases." Could one court handle this volume of work? There is certainly a difficulty here which must be frankly faced. But it does not seem to be insuperable. During the three terms 1940, 1941, and 1942, the Supreme Court's average disposition of appellate cases on the merits was 309 cases. In addition, the Supreme Court disposed of an average of four original cases on the merits each term. 1 These figures are not strictly comparable, because those for the Supreme Court are based on docket numbers, and include dispositions by memoranda as well as by full opinions. But the Supreme Court also disposed of an average of 736 petitions for certiorari during these three terms, and it is well known that the consideration of these petitions is a very time-consuming task. Moreover, the average difficulty and importance of cases before the Supreme Court is probably considerably greater than that of the run of tax cases. The opinions of the Supreme Court are probably longer and more difficult to prepare than those which would be required for the disposition of tax cases on the average; and they more frequently invoke extended dissents which must require as much time and care in writing as the opinions of the Court. Besides the Supreme Court, reference may be made to the fact that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Thus, it does not seem at all impossible that a Court of Tax Appeals made up of, say, nine judges could handle effectively the volume of appellate tax work which was handled in 1943 by the circuit courts of appeals. But there is another factor of great importance. The establishment of a single Court of Tax Appeals would almost certainly result in a substantial decline in the number of tax cases appealed beyond the trial court. In the first place, it would no longer be necessary to appeal a number of cases in order to obtain a conflict, as under the present system. Many of the cases presented to the several circuit courts of appeals now involve identical or substantially similar issues. Each such case now requires full dress consideration by the circuit court of appeals to which it is appealed. If there were a single court of tax appeals, only one such case would have to be appealed. The decision in that case would establish the law, binding on both the Government and the taxpayers. If another such case should be appealed, it could be summarily disposed of.
Moreover, with the prompter settling of the tax law through the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals there would be far fewer controversies taken from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the trial courts. With fewer cases in the trial courts, there would be fewer appeals. Thus, it seems clear that once the Court of Tax Appeals was established and in full operation the volume of tax appeals would decline to an amount which could be readily handled by a court of perhaps seven and certainly of nine judges. This would not seem to be an inappropriate number of judges to have to make final decisions on all matters of federal taxation, except those involving a question of codstitutional law.
There is a further difficulty which must be considered, and one '1 [VGo.7 I 180'
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THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS by no means easily solved. Under the present system, a taxpayer may have his tax appeal considered by a court which sits fairly near his home. If his case gets to the Supreme Court, he has to go to Washington; but the first and usually final appeal is heard by a circuit court of appeals in his own locality. Often, even this involves a considerable amount of travel. It is over a thousand miles, for example, from Montana to a session of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco; and it may be the best part of a thousand miles for a taxpayer in the northern peninsula of Michigan to attend the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at Cincinnati. But in either case the distance is less than if he had to go to Washington. It seems wholly clear, therefore, that the Court of Tax Appeals would have to be a circuit court in the true sense. It might have its headquarters in Washington, or perhaps New York, or elsewhere, but it would have to arrange for frequent sittings in a number of cities throughout the country. Such a program involves difficulties, including physical difficulties for the judges, but it is certainly feasible and possible. It is the plan now followed by the Tax Court, the judges of which hold hearings throughout the country. It is also the plan followed by the Emergency Court of Appeals, created under the Price Con- In order to insure flexibility, the present provisions in the Judicial Code for transferring judges by designation should be made applicable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Thus, in case the Court of Tax Appeals met an unusual volume of work, or if some of its judges should be disqualified for one reason or another, the Chief Justice should have power to designate other federal judges to sit on the court from time to time. And, similarly, judges of the Court 72 56 STAT. 3z (1942), 5o U. S. C. § 924(c) (Supp. 1943) . It might be that a satisfactory system could be worked out under which hearings would be held in particular cases by somewhat less than the full number of the judges of the court. This is the practice in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for example. That court consists of seven justices, but it is the usual custom for only five to sit in any case. It would be of the greatest importance, however, not to have the Court of Tax Appeals divide into permanently separate divisions. This would go far to negative the finality which is one of the principal reasons for establishing such a court. If a practice should be established under which decisions would be rendered by less than the full membership of the court, such cases must be regarded as binding in subsequent cases before the court to the full extent of stare decisis.
i 8f of Tax Appeals should be available for designation to the circuit courts of appeals or the district courts as occasion should arise. Ordinarily, it would be expected that few such designations would be made, just as few are made now. 73 But the power to make them would be an important means of meeting many possible difficulties which might arise.
A Constitutional Court
The Court of Tax Appeals would be one of our most important tribunals, and it should be clearly established as a constitutional court, with the full power and authority at law and in equity of the present circuit courts of appeals. Its judges should have life tenure, and the full privileges of constitutional federal judges, including freedom from diminution of compensation, and pensions on retirement. It would be hoped that Presidents would see the great public importance of nominating able men for places on such a court, and that it would not become a haven for lame ducks or political misfits. The statute creating the Customs Court provides that not more than five out of the nine judges shall be of the same political party. 7 ' The customs "field probably is, or was, more involved in partisan politics than that of internal revenue.
'
There would not seem to be any sound political reason for making a similar requirement with respect to the Court of Tax Appeals." Whether such a requirement would help to insure appointments to the court on the merits of the appointees, rather than for political reasons, is so doubtful that it would probably be wiser to omit it altogether, and to hope that the court itself would build up such prestige through its important place in the federal judicial system that Presidents would use the utmost care in making appointments to it. Some of the original appointments might well be made from 76 There is no such provision with respect to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. A justice of that court has referred to it as " non-partisan," and felt that the bi-partisan provision as to the Customs Court was unwise and unnecessary. 
The Argument about Specialization
This suggests an objection which may be voiced to the whole plan of a single Court of Tax Appeals. Will the judges not become so specialized and technical that tax decisions will soon become artificial and refined, losing all touch with the general law and with the common law? This is a difficulty which is easy to exaggerate unduly. The judges of the Court of Tax Appeals will presumably be lawyers, and lawyers have a common background and tradition. This may not be the background and tradition of the general public, but at least it is not a different background and tradition in a lawyer who is appointed to the Court of Tax Appeals than in a lawyer who becomes a judge of a circuit court of appeals. Some lawyers are narrow on circuit courts of appeals, or even the Supreme Court, and some may be narrow on the Court of Tax Appeals. The remedy is to use care to appoint men of broad training and outlook, men who will see tax problems in their setting in the general economic and political and social picture. If the judges on the Court of Tax Appeals should nevertheless err, their decisions can be corrected by Congress, which is as nearly in touch with the people as any agency of government we have. The Congress has had to correct a good many decisions in recent years under our present system. There may even be reason to expect that fewer legislative changes would be required if the basic decisions in tax cases were made by a Court of Tax Appeals whose exclusive function it was to establish a consistent and coherent body of judicial precedent in tax cases.
Moreover, this argument represents a complete misconception of the tax field. It is high time that tax lawyers rise up to defend themselves against the charge that tax work is narrowing and stifling. On the contrary, it seems difficult to find a field which leads practitioners more widely through the whole fabric of the law. A tort lawyer is a tort lawyer, and a corporation lawyer is a corporation lawyer. But a tax lawyer must deal constantly not only with statutes and committee reports and regulations, but also with questions of property, contracts, agency, partnerships, corpo-
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IVol. 57 rations, equity, trusts, insurance, procedure, accounting, economics, ethics, philosophy. He must be broad in his background and broad in his outlook, if he is, to deal effectively with the manifold problems which make up the modern field of tax law. There is no reason to expect that a judge in this field should become narrow and technical and specialized. Tax lawyers who express such a fear do not do justice to the intellectual potentialities of their chosen field.
THE TRAYNOR PLAN
One who has read this far will undoubtedly recall the recominendations made six years ago by Professor Traynor (now Mr. Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California), and that a proposal for a single court of tax appeals was an element in the so-called Traynor Plan." That proposal was epgulfed in opposition, 7 ' and it may seem bold to re-advance a portion of it now. But there are significant differences, and those differences and so cl nt as to warrant thoughtful consideration for the present proposal on its merits.
i. In the Traynor Plan the recommendation for a single court 122: " The so-called ' Traynor Plan ' for reshaping the frame of Federal tax litigation met a blast of criticism which bore more heat than light."
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THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS of tax appeals was only one element in a much larger scheme. The plan also called for a reorganization of procedure within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the basic purpose of which was to give the Bureau's determinations administrative finality and to eliminate any trial de novo before an independent tribunal. That was an unsound recommendation and was alone enough to warrant the defeat of the Traynor Plan. This is no criticism of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but merely a recognition of the vastness of the administrative job that has to be done and of the fact that it must be done by thousands of persons without the possibility of control or decision in each case by the central agency, as is the case with other agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the Federal Power Commission, or even the National Labor Relations Board. Moreover, this proposal would have completely changed the handling of cases within the Bureau. It would have formalized the procedure and made largely impossible the conferences and adjustments which are an essential part of administering a system which affects millions of taxpayers.
No such recommendation is included in the present proposal. It does not clearly appear that any essential changes in the present procedure of the Bureau are either necessary or desirable. The recent decentralization of the Bureau, and grant of power to the field offices, particularly of the Technical Staff, have gone far to make the Bureau an effective agency in tax administration. Apart from normal evolution in this procedure, the Bureau's major problem would seem to be to maintain the personnel of high quality essential to the effective operation of any administrative system. But one of the healthy factors in the Bureau's administration is the fact that both parties know that the next step beyond the Bureau is an unrestricted review of the case by a wholly independent tribunal. No recommendation for a change in that arrangement is made here.
2. Under the Traynor proposal, jurisdiction in tax cases was to be taken away from the district courts and the Court of Claims. All tax cases would be heard by the Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court. This proposal was assailed on two grounds: (a) It deprived the taxpayer of the right to a trial in his own community; and (b) it deprived the taxpayer of any right to trial by jury. The present recommendation suggests no change in the jurisdiction of I185 the district courts or of the Court of Claims. Taxpayers will still be able to bring their tax cases in their local district courts to the same extent as at the present. In some ways it may seem anomalous to maintain this remedy, and it is not availed of by taxpayers very often. But whether otherwise sound or not, it is regarded as a matter of importance by some taxpayers and their counsel, and it may fairly and properly be retained as an important safety valve in the tax system. It not only preserves the right to trial by jury, but also answers a difficulty which may be felt by some taxpayers or their counsel that the Tax Court of the United States is too close to or too greatly influenced by the Treasury. The establishment of a system of review by a single court of tax appeals need not affect our procedure as to the nisi prius trial of tax cases in any respect, and all remedies, and all forms of trial in a local tribunal, may be fully maintained. This should answer a very considerable part of the opposition which was directed against the Traynor Plan."
3. Closely related is the fact that under the Traynor Plan there would be no remedy available to taxpayers in a constitutional court. The distinction between " constitutional " and " legislative " courts is rather esoteric, 80 and the court proposed in the Traynor Plan might well have been a constitutional court." But it is clear that the court here recommended will be and will have to be a constitutional court, for it will have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the district courts. As these are clearly constitutional courts, it would certainly be fitting and probably necessary that the court with jurisdiction to review their decisions should likewise be a constitutional court. The Court of Tax Appeals here recommended is to be a constitutional court with all the status and authority that inheres in such a tribunal. This, too, should go far to answer criticisms which were made against the Traynor Plan.
4. It may be thought that Professor Traynor failed to appreciate the dignity and importance of tax appeals in our judicial and legal 79 It is high time, however, that the Tax Court be given jurisdiction over claims for refund, and that a procedure be developed under which the taxpayer can pay the tax asserted to be due in a deficiency letter but nevertheless take the case directly to the Tax Court for review. These procedures, however, would be optional, preserving in all cases the right to sue in the district court or the Court of Claims. system. His single court of tax appeals was an indefinite sort of stepchild, and he thought it might well be that the tax appellate work should be handled more or less incidentally by the Court of Claims or by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." And it was suggested by one of Professor Traynor's supporters that tax appeals should be heard by the general administrative court which was to be established under the then pending LoganWalter Bill." It was understandable that this throwing of tax cases into the general hopper along with all the miscellany of administrative law -with which tax law really has almost no relation -should be anathema to tax lawyers.
The present proposal calls for the establishment of a wholly independent court of all the dignity and importance of the present circuit courts of appeals. It could easily become one of the strongest and most influential courts in the country. It would recognize the importance of tax appeals rather than l6se them in the general shuffle of miscellaneous administrative law.
5. The Traynor Plan called for a single court of tax appeals which would sit only in Washington. It is understandable that there should be objections to such an arrangement. The present recommendation seeks to establish a court which need not have its headquarters in Washington," and which, in any event, will hold regular sessions at several convenient geographical places in the country. There are admittedly difficulties in carrying out this part of the recommendation. But it is important that it be carried out. A completely centralized court of tax appeals would meet opposition, and that opposition would be legitimate. The present proposal, therefore, specifically contemplates a court which will go regularly on circuit, so that taxpayers will not need, on the whole, to go further for the presentation of their tax appeals than is necessary under the present system of appeals to the various circuit courts of appeals. It is not difficult to agree, however, with the part of the argument which said that there was not enough merit in a plan for formal decentralization of the Tax Court to make it desirable to adopt such a change. The Tax Court now holds hearings throughout the country, so that the geographical needs of the taxpayers are met. And although there is considerable diversity in the decisions by its various judges, there is not that sharp and territorial conflict which would necessarily arise if the Tax Court sat in separate geographical divisions. Accordingly, the present proposal includes no recommendation for any change in the procedure or organization of the Tax Court."
Local Law
Two further objections were made to the proposal for a single court of tax appeals in the Traynor Plan which should be mentioned here. Some of the opponents argued that tax questions so often involve matters of local law that tax appeals should be heard by local courts which would be familiar with the intricacies of that law. It is difficult to think that this argument was not overemphasized. In the first place, the proportion of tax cases actually involving questions of purely local law is very small. It was estimated at the time that perhaps ten per cent of the tax cases turn on questions of local law. But in many of the cases the question of local law is neither unusual nor difficult. 1415) should meet with taxpayer approval, and might well be adopted now by administrative action. Some limits should also be imposed on the present rule (see INT. REV. CODE § § 272(e), 87l(e), and 1012(e)) under which the Commissioner has an unlimited time to assert additional deficiencies as long as a case is pending before the Tax Court.
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THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS very small proportion of the cases which really involve a question upon which the special skill of a local court would be necessary or desirable. In the second place, the great majority of the tax cases are now heard by the Tax Court, which has no special competency in matters of local law. And finally, there is a very large measure-of illusion in the notion that the circuit courts of appeals to which cases are now appealed have any special skill in local law. It would be extremely difficult for example to show any reason why the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be especially qualified in the law of Montana, or that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was especially talented in the law of Maine. It may be, in a particular case, that one, or possibly two, of the judges of a circuit court of appeals will have practiced in a state whose law comes before him. But it would be largely a matter of chance that his practice would have taken him into the details of the field which is actually involved in a particular case. And even if he were especially skilled, he would only be one of the judges of a bench of at least three.
After all, tax cases like other cases are heard upon brief and oral argument. If a question of local law is involved, it will be discussed and argued in detail by counsel, and the decision of such questions on such arguments is the sort of thing which judges are called upon to do and are ordinarily skilled in doing. With the exception of Louisiana, we all follow the same legal system. The importance of the peculiarities of local law can easily be overemphasized on a question such as this. The proposed Court of Tax Appeals would naturally have a geographical spread in its membership, and would seem to be as well qualified to handle questions of local law as the Supreme Court is today. It would be hard to show that the latter court had failed conspicuously in matters of local law in the many tax cases which have come before it. It seems equally unnecessary to fear disaster on this point from a Court of Tax Appeals.
Finally, it may be said that for the few questions of peculiarly local law which will arise in tax cases, we should have available a better procedure for having them determined by persons locally skilled than the completely hit or miss means which is available through appeals to the circuit court of appeals. There should be established in connection with the trial procedure in the Tax Court and in the district courts a regular method for the reference of questions of local law to the appropriate local tribunal." In this way questions of state law could be determined by the state courts themselves. These determinations would be controlling on all courts dealing with federal tax questions. This would seem to be the real answer to the problem of local law in federal taxation. The use of the local law argument to oppose the creation of a Court of Tax Appeals seems on the whole essentially hollow.
The Argument for the Status Quo
The 'other argument which was made against the prbposal for a single court of tax appeals in the Traynor Plan reduces to little more than the argument whioh must be met by all attempts to achieve change or progress in any legal field. It was argued rather vigorously that the present system of delays and conflicts was not necessarily undesirable. Thus, it was argued that " If the truly right answer is the ultimate goal of all concerned, a second' con-i sideration by a second tribunal often corrects an initial error." 8 And in a similar vein it was contended that " The delay resulting from conflicts may be worth the ultimate assurance of the right
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answer.
The assumption in these statements that there is always a" right answer " in these questions is interesting. The truth is apparently always clear if we only keep on trying to look for it in enough places. Certainly we should strive our best to get as near the truth as we can. And long experience has shown that at least one review, with collective judgment, is an important procedural tool to that end. But there must be some end to the process. We do not have two Supreme Courts to produce cdhflicts and a super Supreme Court to reach the right answers. Mr. Surrey was almost surely right when he wrote:
Many a tax question is no nearer a "right"' decision after four or five circuit courts of appeals have battled over it than when tle first court pronounced its judgment. All that has happened is that each of the several reasonable but contradictory positions has been given the stamp of judicial approval. Meanwhile a confused Bureau and bewildered taxpayers, who would be quite content to adjust themselves to the first decision if it were left unchallenged, are forced to struggle along as best they can until the Supreme Court selects one of the available alternatives and it becomes the " right "-answer, at least until Congress acts. . *..89
The delays in the course of justice would be long enough if we did have a single Court of Tax Appeals. Moreover, when these objections were written, the tax bar had a considerable nostalgic memory of the Supreme Court of the early and middle thirties. How many lawyers would feel now that the Supreme Court has always reached the "right answer " in recent years? 90 It is not at all clear that taxpayers and their counsel would not be better satisfied to have tax decisions made by some other tribunal.
Much of the opposition based on this ground is simply an expression of the essential overconservatism of the bar. The opposition of lawyers to the abolition of the Circuit Courts in 19I2 was organized and violent. It was voiced by some of the leaders of the bar, including Elihu Root 9 ' and Joseph H. Choate. 92 The American Bar Association's contribution to the situation was a resolution requesting Congress to postpone action in order that -after a 90 It would be hard to find a tax lawyer who would prefer, e.g., the Supreme Court's decision in the Virginian Hotel case to the result reached in Pittsburgh Brewing Co. v. Comm'r (107 F.(2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ). The same might be said Among the arguments advanced by Mr. Choate's committee was the following: " The change will be unsettling and will substitute a judicial system not understood, and new, for one well defined and known." This would seem to be a fine illustration of the view later expressed by Senator Root himself that opposition to change " has always come from lawyers who had succeeded and were content with things as they were; who did not want practice and proceedings changed from that with which they were familiar . . century's experience -there might be more time for " investigation "! 9 Does it not now seem clear that the change then made was a highly desirable one, long overdue? It is hard to escape the feeling that the lawyers' opposition then was simply an instance of the automatic opposition to any change felt by many members of the bar unless they force themselves to consider a proposal without an overwhelming predisposition in favor of the status quo.
Is it not now high time that we take steps to overhaul our creaking system of review in federal tax cases?
Our tax laws are highly complex. Much of the complexity in the statute is probably unavoidable if we are to have a statute which is fair. 94 But to add to that complexity the present uncertainty and confusion throughout most of the period of administration of the statute is more than we need bear. With the tremendous problems of an excess profits tax, with intricate statutes like the Revenue
